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Abstract
In this article, we explore civil society mobilisation and the impact of organised interests on the energy policies of two post-
communist countries—Hungary and Czechia—and specifically nuclear energy. Drawing on numerous hypotheses from the
literature on organised interests, we explore how open both political systems are for civil society input and what interest
group-specific and socio-economic factors mediate the influence of organised interests. Based on the preference attain-
ment method, our case studies focus on the extent to which organised interests have succeeded bringing nuclear energy
legislation in line with their preferences.We find that while both democracies are open to civil society input, policy-making
is generally conducted in state-industrial circles, whereby anti-nuclear and renewable energy advocates are at best able
to make minor corrections to already pre-determined policies.
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1. Introduction
In this article, we explore civil society mobilisation in two
post-communist countries, Czechia and Hungary, while
specifically analysing the impact of organised interests
on nuclear energy policy-making. The post-communist
political transformation is indeed a well-studied phe-
nomenon. In the early transformation phase, most stud-
ies focussed primarily on the re-design of political in-
stitutions and constitutional arrangements (Hellman,
1998; Ramet, 2010; Stark & Bruszt, 1998). More re-
cently though, numerous analyses addressed civil society
mobilisation (Carmin, 2010; Fink-Hafner, 2011; Howard,
2003; Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2006) and the develop-
ment of interest intermediation systems (Avdagic, 2005;
Pleines, 2011). This is a crucial aspect of democratisa-
tion because organised interests—as conveyors of inputs
into the political process—can be regarded as a precon-
dition of democracy (Dahl, 1971). While organised inter-
ests indeedmay have a legitimising effect by injecting cit-
izens’ preferences into decision-making, the democratic
process may also be undermined when special interests
continuously assert their demands to the detriment of
others (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Moreover, democracy
may be endangered by weak or inefficient channels of
interest intermediation. Crouch (2004) defines this con-
dition as a “post-democratic” legitimation crisis, hence
a situation in which institutions exist formally, but civil
society no longer shapes policies.
Organised interests are burdened with a difficult
legacy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Under
socialism, civil society activity was largely channelled
through communist parties, which in turn converted
any pre-existing interest associations into their own ap-
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pendages (Kubik, 2005). The oppression of civic partic-
ipation outside the party has reinforced the view that
post-communist organised interests remain weak and
fragmented (Howard, 2003). For example, Ágh (1996)
speaks of a “missing middle”, thus an absence of ef-
fective links between societal interests, the state and
market institutions. In contrast, Fink-Hafner (1998) con-
tends that civil society is being reinvented, a view backed
by numerous analyses on organisational membership
(Petrova & Tarrow, 2007) and parliamentary representa-
tion (Fink-Hafner, 2011). Along these lines, Guasti (2016)
argues that civil society has emerged as an “arena for
contestation of governmental policies and ideational al-
ternative to national-conservative ideologies” (Guasti,
2016, p. 229).
In either case, interest organisations constitute an
important field of research regarding the functioning
of democracy, in particular in CEE. Due to the histori-
cal oppression of democratic mobilisation and the com-
munist system’s heavy burden on civil society, it is cru-
cial to assess—almost three decades after the fall of
the Berlin Wall—whether and which organised interests
have shaped post-communist policies. Against this back-
ground, this article focusses on the design of interest in-
termediation structures and, specifically, the actual influ-
ence of organised interests on recent nuclear energy leg-
islation in Hungary and Czechia.
Energy is a highly relevant policy area in CEE and
beyond, as secure, cost-effective and environmentally
friendly energy is a precondition for functioning societies.
CEE countries generally share a legacy of environmen-
tal neglect and inefficient energy usage. While the post-
communist transformation, European integration and,
notably, the bankruptcy of many energy-intensive indus-
tries indeed resulted in a reduction of usage, CEE is still
characterised by limited natural resources, increasing
prices as well as dependence on Russian energy (Aalto,
Nyyssönen, Kojo, & Pal, 2017; Binhack & Tichý, 2012).
Thus, CEE countries are simultaneously aiming to pro-
mote renewable, safe, and diversified energy sources, in-
crease efficiency and form regional markets.
Drawing on the well-established literature on inter-
est groups (Dür, 2008; Eising, 2008; Klüver, 2013), we
explore the following research question: How open are
post-communist political systems for civil society input
and what factors condition the influence of interest
groups on nuclear energy policy? Taking inspiration from
Kitschelt’s (1986) study on anti-nuclear movements in
western democracies, we assess the accessibility of post-
communist political systems for interest groups and high-
light the factors which have increased or hampered the
impact of anti-nuclear movements.
We aim to modestly advance three bodies of
research—the literature on post-communist civil soci-
ety, research on interest groups in general, and research
focussing on CEE energy policy. Substantively we ad-
dress the national energy strategies laid out in the Czech
State Energy Policy (SEP; Ministerstvo průmyslu a ob-
chodu, 2015) and Hungarian National Energy Strategy
(NES) 2030 (Nemzeti Energiastratégia, 2030) from 2012
(Nemzeti Fejlesztési Minisztérium, 2012). The timeframe
of analysis is from 2011 to 2018, whereby the Fukushima
disaster is a turning point which compelled many coun-
tries to reassess nuclear energy and the viability of their
energy mix.
Next we outline pre-existing studies, before present-
ing our theoretical framework and methodological ap-
proach. In our empirical analysis, we first discuss the over-
all energy policy background and identify key interest
groups. We then assess to what extent they pushed rele-
vant legislation in their preferred direction, before identi-
fying the key factors that condition their impact. Finally,
we elaborate on the modes of interest intermediation
by engaging with classical concepts of statism, pluralism
and corporatism (Fink-Hafner, 2011; Siaroff, 1999). Our
analysis reveals that statist arrangements with some cor-
poratist elements have emerged, whereby governments
strongly incorporate nuclear energy providers into official
policy-making, thus resulting in formidable state-industry
alliances to the detriment renewable energies groups.
2. Post-Communist Civil Society and Energy
Policy-Making
Political science is rich in studies on civil society and or-
ganised interests. However, they focus largely on west-
ern countries (Baumgartner, 2009; Binderkrantz, Chris-
tiansen, & Pedersen, 2014; Mahoney, 2007), while or-
ganised interests and lobbying in the European Union
(EU) have increasingly attracted attention (Klüver, 2009;
Schneider & Baltz, 2003). Political scientists have also
more recently significantly enhanced our understanding
of the determinants of lobbying success (Binderkrantz &
Rasmussen, 2015; Bunea, 2013; Klüver, 2013).
Although CEE has largely been overlooked by such
research, the 2000s gave rise to numerous studies on
civil society in post-communist democracies. Most no-
tably, Howard (2003) paints an ambivalent picture of civil
society in CEE by arguing that it neither endangers the
democratic system itself nor leads to the development of
anti-democratic activities. Fundamentally, he contends
that mistrust in the political process has led to low civic
participation (Howard, 2003). Pérez-Solórzano Borragán
(2006) also highlights two reasons for the low civic par-
ticipation: historical legacies and disappointment with
the regime transformation. The former refers to the op-
pression of civil society by the communist regime, result-
ing in suspicion towards the state. Moreover, CEE inter-
est organisations suffer from their lack of experience, or-
ganisational capacity, and knowledge of “what civil soci-
ety is and how it operates” (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán,
2006, p. 138).
In his analysis of the development and regulation of
organised interests in CEE, McGrath’s (2008) diagnosis
is the same: the discouragement of non-partisan civil
society engagement and lacking skills and motivation
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of civil society are major impediments to mobilisation
(McGrath, 2008). In a seminal article, Vráblíková (2009)
finds that the factors determining participation greatly
vary between CEE countries. More recently, Fink-Hafner
(2011) focussed on relations between interest groups
and CEE national parliaments and demonstrated that the
weakness of the parliament is frequently interconnected
with its level of attractiveness for interest groups (Fink-
Hafner, 2011).
Scholars have also addressed the impact of the EU on
individual organised interests (Císař & Vráblíková, 2013).
Guasti, for example, argues that “new norms, ideals and
collective understandings” facilitated higher civil partici-
pation (Guasti, 2016, p. 230). Her finding of a civil society
revival in CEE is also supported by other studies address-
ing the importance of EU access in transforming the insti-
tutional setting for organised interests (Fagan & Kopecký,
2017; Vándor, Traxler, Millner, & Meyer, 2017). Yet de-
spite our enhanced understanding of civil society mobili-
sation, only few authors have assessed its impact on spe-
cific policies (for an exception see Gallai, Döme, Molnár,
& Reich, 2015).
2.1. Energy Policy Research in CEE
Numerous analyses on CEE energy policy exist (Bal-
maceda, 2002; Binhack & Tichý, 2012; Szulecki, Fis-
cher, Gullberg, & Sartor, 2016; Vlček & Černoch, 2013),
some of which have even addressed organised inter-
ests (Carmin, 2010; Tosun & Schulze, 2015). According
to Andersen, Goldthau and Sitter (2017), the main expla-
nation for energy policy choices within these countries
is neither the post-communist legacy nor geographical
particularities. CEE rather differs regarding attitudes to-
wards energy policy: first, there is little unity on the EU
level mainly due to distinct national preferences. Second,
differences persist regarding perceptions of priorities
and structural obstacles in these countries due to “en-
ergy populism, corruption and general incompetence”
(Andersen et al., 2017, p. 215).
Balmaceda (2002) analyses the energy-related
geostrategic position of CEE between the EU and Russia
and argues that the creation of a gas market will posi-
tively impact the energy situation in CEE. Binhack and
Tichý (2012), however, stress that there is an asymmet-
ric relationship between Czechia and Russia regarding
Czechia’s dependence on Russian energy, which in turn
has been somewhat balanced by the EU’s involvement
in transnational energy policy-making. Numerous qual-
itative studies also have elaborated on energy mixes
and energy “democracy”, several of which include CEE
(Szulecki, 2018; Szulecki et al., 2016). Bakos (2001) ex-
plored the privatisation and liberalisation of electricity in
Hungary, suggesting an asymmetry similar to the already
mentioned case of Czechia, while Aalto et al. (2017) con-
ducted a comparative study on Russian-built nuclear re-
actors in Hungary and Finland as part of Russian “nuclear
energy diplomacy”.
Regarding Czechia, Frantál and Malý (2017) address
community support for nuclear power plant (NPP) expan-
sion. They conclude that the support of two-thirds of
Czech society is related to their “general perception of
pros of nuclear power” (Frantál &Malý, 2017, p. 134). Yet
radioactivewaste is a problematic issue, drawing the con-
cern of municipalities (Ocelík, Osička, Zapletalová, Čer-
noch, & Dančák, 2017). A rather technical analysis of en-
ergy strategies conducted by Minin and Vlček (2018) re-
veals that the Fukushima accident did not affect nuclear
energy usage at all. Osička and Černoch (2017) argue
that structural and cultural factors affected pro-nuclear
policy-making in Czechia while Ocelík et al. (2017) ad-
dress the framing of nuclear waste storage places.
Several studies have also focussed on civil society
mobilisation in post-communist energy policy-making.
In her important contribution on environmental gover-
nance in Hungary and Czechia, Carmin (2010) regards re-
sources and knowledge as important assets for organised
interests to participate in decision-making processes. Re-
sources are necessary to maintain their activity level
while knowledge and expertise are preconditions for sig-
nificant input (Carmin, 2010). Devaux (2006) analyses
the influence of professional organisations on environ-
mental issues and determines that organisations from
the Soviet era with expert knowledge are still most influ-
ential. Tosun and Schulze (2015), by contrast, analysed
the influence of interest groups in a very specific case—
compliance with EU biofuel targets. Interestingly, their
analysis indicates, first, that their influence varies within
countries and, second, that biofuel producers more sig-
nificantly impact the adoption of targets than environ-
mental groups (Tosun & Schulze, 2015).
3. Theoretical Framework
Keeping these significant research advancements in
mind, we propose a study which applies the perspec-
tives of civil society mobilisation and interest interme-
diation to post-communist energy policy-making. Before
outlining our working hypotheses, we briefly elaborate
on terminology. One outstanding characteristic of inter-
est groups is their fragmented nature and heterogeneity
(Eising, 2008), resulting in numerous terms such as spe-
cial interest organisations, associations, lobbies, civil so-
ciety organisations, social movements, civil groups, etc.
Following Eising (2008), we pragmatically stick to the
terms “interest groups” and “organised interests” and
define them as non-state, organised groups pursuing po-
litical interests by seeking to influence political decision-
making processes. They are characterised by three fac-
tors: “organization, political interest, and informality”
(Eising, 2008, p. 5). Organisation means that they strive
to “influence policy outcomes….Political interest refers
to attempts…to push public policy in one direction or an-
other on the behalf of constituencies or a general politi-
cal idea”while “[i]nformality relates to the fact that inter-
est groups do not normally seek public office but pursue
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their goals through informal interactions with politicians
and bureaucrats” (Eising, 2008, p. 5). Against this back-
ground, we define influence as ‘control over outcomes’
to the extent that interest groups “influence outcomes in
a way that brings them closer to their ideal points” (Dür
& De Bièvre, 2007, p. 3).
Yet what factors mediate the influence of interest
groups on policy outcomes? Dür and De Bièvre (2007)
distinguish between interest group-related, issue-related
and socio-economic factors. Olson’s (1971) seminal work
showed how the structure and focus of interest groups
may impact their means for collective action. Diffuse in-
terests (e.g., environmental or consumer groups) may
bemore difficult to organise than concentrated interests
(e.g., business lobbies, coal lobbies). Accordingly, size
may be critical: the bigger a group, the fewer individuals
may take action to achieve common interests. This im-
plies a certain relationship between individual behaviour
and group size. Olson (1971) argues that individuals’ ef-
forts to contribute to collective well-being exceed the
benefits they receive in return. This creates a free-rider
problem since, if there are public benefits emerging from
collective action, not only individuals who actively pur-
sued them, but also those who did not, benefit. This may
encourage individuals to “free-ride” on the efforts of few.
Smaller groups, in particular business interests, there-
fore may have an organisational advantage as they are
easier to organise,monitor and control than large groups.
Therefore, we hypothesise that:
H1: Concentrated organised interests wield greater
clout over policy than diffuse interests due to their in-
herent organisational advantage.
Yet Olson’s theory arguably overlooks other internal char-
acteristics of interest groups, specifically their resources.
These can encompass material aspects such as funding,
but also non-material assets like public support, policy ex-
pertise and information on voters’ interests and the pos-
sibilities of other policy-makers (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007).
The calculation is straightforward:
H2: Organised interests with greater monetary,
staffing and personnel resources wield greater clout
over policy than organised interests with fewer
resources.
Technical expertise may also shape policy outcomes, es-
pecially in energy policy which is ideally shaped by sound
science and expertise. If an issue is technically compli-
cated, policy-makers may require consultations with con-
cerned organised interests (Klüver, 2011). According to
Bernhagen (2012) information is a great source of lobby-
ing power: to assess its relevance, the expected costs	of
information must be evaluated. Channels of influence
usually include the relationships, commitments, and ex-
pected costs of policy-makers and lobbyists. Information
may entail technical expertise, data on costs and citizens’
preferences as well as the assessment of policy conse-
quences. Therefore:
H3: Organised interests with specialised expertise will
enjoy greater recognition and legitimacy and thus
wield greater clout over policy.
Looking beyond factors inherent in interest groups, their
capacity to influence policy may depend on the polit-
ical and socio-economic context. Some structures may
strengthen concentrated interests, others diffuse inter-
ests, while also potentially facilitating or impeding access
to policy-makers. Lobbying regulations are one such fac-
tor. In systems with weak regulations, private interests,
especially those with substantial resources, may more
easily penetrate the policy-making apparatus.
H4: Resource-rich organised interests will wield
greater clout in systems with lenient lobbying reg-
ulations, as policy-makers are more responsive to
wealthy interest advocates.
Besides these conventional hypotheses, we also explore
the interest intermediation systems evolving in both
countries. Statism regards private groups as a distur-
bance to public life and builds policy-making around
a strong, technocratically operating executive which
seldom consults non-governmental stakeholders (Woll,
2009). Corporatism is by contrast a type of coordi-
nated capitalism in which policy-making is transferred
to semi-private organisations, generally representatives
of labour and capital (Siaroff, 1999). By contrast, plural-
ism envisages amultiplicity of representative groupswho
compete for influence, form temporary alliances, and
competitively pressure governments. Generally more
free-market capitalist systems bring about pluralist forms
of interest representation while coordinated economies
(Soskice & Hall, 2001) tend to produce corporatist struc-
tures, to the detriment of excluded interest groups.
4. Methodological Approach
Measuring interest group influence is notoriously com-
plicated, as preferences may be fluid, unstable and un-
clearly asserted (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008). Influ-
ence may be based on a sense of obligation, authority
or respect or serve to change the “influencee’s” percep-
tion of potential alternatives. Hence, decision-makers
frequently base their decisions on the anticipated reac-
tions of others. Moreover, interest groups may be less
concerned with shaping policy than securing their own
survival by mobilising resources (Schmitter & Streeck,
1999). Baumgartner (2009) also argues thatwemust con-
sider the status quo and difficulty of policy change. If or-
ganised interests seek to maintain a strongly embedded
status quo, lobbying success may be a “non-event”.
To partially overcome these difficulties, we conduct
a qualitative comparative policy analysis of Hungary and
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Czechia. Both post-communist countries can be regarded
as most similar cases regarding a wide range of variables
(e.g., new democracies, economic transition, size, geo-
graphical position, and legacy of communist energy pol-
icy). However, they are different regarding two variables
which, as outlined in our hypotheses, potentially affect
the means of influence of organised interests: economic
coordination and lobbying regulations. Hungary exhibits
a higher degree of market coordination (Tarlea, 2017),
while Czechia is a more liberal market economy (Fink-
Hafner, 2011; McGrath, 2008). Thus, we would expect
corporatist interest intermediation structures to emerge
in Hungary, and more pluralist structures in Czechia,
which in turn may constrain or facilitate capacity for ac-
tion of interest organisations. Moreover, no encompass-
ing lobbying regulations exist in Czechia despite many
attempts to regulate lobbying (Reutter, 2012). In Hun-
gary there has been a voluntary registry since 1994 and
a far-reaching lobbying act was passed in 2006 (Mc-
Grath, 2008)1. Against this background, we secure a rela-
tively large degree of variation along our country-specific,
socio-economic variables to assess their impact on pol-
icy, while variations between interest groups operating
in both countries (e.g., concentrated/diffuse, expertise,
resources) enable us to assess their influence in two dif-
ferent settings.
Our comparative case studies rely on the preference
attainment method (Dür, 2008; Dür & De Bièvre, 2007;
Howard, 2003). The method (Mahoney, 2007) entails
comparing the “outcomes of political processes…with
the ideal points of actors” (Dür, 2008, p. 566). We deter-
mine the initial positions of the lead ministry, the final
national position and the ideal points of various interest
groups. We then define influence as “the difference be-
tween two absolute differences: between a group’s ideal
position and the initial position of the lead ministry, and
between a group’s ideal position and the final national
position” (Dür, 2008, p. 567). Hence, the aim is to as-
sess whether interest groups could either shift the ini-
tial position of the lead ministry or shift the final pol-
icy position towards its ideal preferences. Our case stud-
ies aim to assess the applicability of our hypotheses in
two different socio-economic settings and thus identify
the causal mechanisms posing obstacles to or facilitating
the attainment of preferences. Unlike a rigid statistical
approach, qualitative case studies enable the in-depth,
context-specific study of factors shaping the impact of in-
terest groups, while also providing leeway for the anal-
ysis of previously unforeseen influential factors. Further-
more, comparative case studies allow us to study the pro-
cess itself and how “initial conditions are translated into
outcomes” (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 389).
We analysed a large body of qualitative data includ-
ing media coverage, statements of interest groups, gov-
ernment documents and secondary literature. We also
conducted six interviews (three respectively in Czechia
andHungary) with organisations lobbying for and against
nuclear energy. The interview partners were chosen
based on a population ecology of energy interest groups,
whereby the selectionwas narrowed down to the groups
most frequently mentioned in media coverage on en-
ergy reform and who presented encompassing posi-
tion papers on energy reform. We limited the number
of “big energy-policy players” to 4–5 organisations per
country, representing both pro- and anti-nuclear views.
This enabled us to identify and contact actors who ac-
tively sought to influence energy legislation. The approx-
imately 45-minute interviews focussed on the degree
of issue-specific preference attainment (yes, no, par-
tially) and included numerous questions pertaining to re-
sources, expertise, and strategies of interest groups as
well as the extent to which these factors were facilita-
tive to them in attaining their own preferences and to
others groups in attaining their opposing preferences.
The interviews were then transcribed and coded2. Our
empirical analysis is structured as follows: we first pro-
vide background information on energy policies and in-
volved interest associations. We then descriptively out-
line which organisations asserted their preferences and
why, before linking each hypothesis to empirical reali-




The 2015 Czech SEP and Hungarian NES 2030 of 2012
are the most recent energy policy frameworks, both of
which focus on nuclear energy. Currently, one-third of
Czech electricity production stems from NPPs. There are
six operating power reactors, four in Dukovany with in-
definite licences and two in Temelín. The owner and op-
erator is ČEZ energetic enterprises of which nearly 70%
is state-owned (World Nuclear Association, 2018b). In
Hungary, almost 50% of the electricity supply is gener-
ated by NPPs. The country has four units located in Paks
while a contract for two additional power reactors was
signed despite an incident in 2003 during which radioac-
tive waste polluted water and plants. The owner and op-
erator is the state-run MVM Paks Nuclear Power Plant
Ltd. (World Nuclear Association, 2018). The Czech SEP
calls for an increase in nuclear capacities. It identifies
support among citizens for nuclear energy despite safety
concerns, as well as a preference for an energy mix and
the replacement of coal energy. It targets a 50% share
of nuclear sources until 2040, thus the construction of
new units in already existing NPPs. It also postpones to
1 For critique of its effectiveness, see Transparency International Hungary (2014a).
2 The paragraphs of transcripts served as coding units. The coding categories reflected the hypotheses, i.e., type of organisation, finances, most important
issues/interests, etc. Relevant information was then extracted for the terms “(partial) success”, “(partial) influence” and compared with other interview
results as well as primary and secondary literature.
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2025 the decision on nuclear waste storage. The Hungar-
ian NEP 2030 additionally targets the expansion of Paks
and stresses the importance of nuclear energy for energy
self-sufficiency.
5.2. Energy Interest Group Landscape
Since 1989, Czechia has experienced a reconstruction
of the system of interest intermediation, whereby the
number of lobbies has grown rapidly (Rakušanová, 2007)
and umbrella organisations have emerged. As for nu-
clear energy, economic, trade and environmental associ-
ations (see Table 1.) are particularly relevant. The former
represents labour and capital, creating a form of collec-
tive interest representation harmonising heterogeneous
socio-economic interests into one association, while en-
vironmental associations aim to ensure the public inter-
est in a healthy environment. Based on our overview
of Czech media and policy-related literature, we cate-
gorised the most relevant actors in Czech nuclear energy
into four groups: the state, more specifically theMinistry
of Industry and Trade; actors associated with the state,
industries and organisations favouring nuclear energy,
e.g., ČEZ, Česká nukleární společnost (ČNS), State Of-
fice for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB), etc.; environmental actors,
usually opposing nuclear energy such as Hnutí DUHA,
Greenpeace, Jihočeské matky, Calla, Občanské Sdružení
v havarijní zóně, etc.; and the municipalities affected by
nuclear legislation.
The transformation in Hungary was regarded as
successful mainly because of the development of civil
society. However, the number of interest groups has
decreased (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2018) and in
2003 a National Guarantee Fund was established since
many organisations lacked the necessary resources
to operate. Currently, scholars have also argued that
semi-authoritarian structures have stunted civil society
growth, a problem further compounded by their weak
organisation and social embeddedness (Reutter, 2012).
Only few environmental protection interest groups
exist, while economic associations are more numerous.
In our overview of the policy arena, we identified sev-
eral energy-related stakeholders: the Government and
the Ministry of Development; state-associated or pro-
nuclear energy institutions: MVM, Hungary’s National
Atomic Energy Committee (OAB), Hungarian Atomic
Energy Authority (HAEA) etc.; actors usually opposing
nuclear energy such as Greenpeace, Energiaklub; and fi-
nally, municipalities. Before evaluating the factors affect-
ing the influence of interest groups, we address whether
they were able to attain their preferences based on a
distinction between nuclear supporters and opponents.
Supporters, usually industrial interests, emphasise ben-
efits over risks while opponents represented by environ-
mental groups (see Table 2.) highlight risks (Sarlós, 2015).
Overall, the ministry belongs to the former.
5.3. Preference Attainment Analysis
The main goals of the Czech energy policy were security,
export competitiveness and self-sufficiency, whereby
new nuclear reactors are supposed to reduce green-
house gases (International Energy Agency, 2016). The
initial position of the lead ministry was to increase the
Table 1. Environmental stakeholders in Czechia, information based on interest groups websites.
Actor (and founding) Staff Volunteers Finances Members
Jihočeské matky (1992) 3 yes 42,700 € n.a.
Hnutí DUHA (Praha) (1989) 40 yes 600,000 € n.a.
Calla (1991) 2 yes 75,000 € 30
Greenpeace Česká republika (1990) 17 yes 560,000 € n.a.
Občanské Sdružení v havarijní zóně (2001) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Centrum pro dopravu a energetiku (2000) 6 n.a. 30,000 € n.a.
Glopolis (2004) 22 n.a. 512,000 € n.a.
Table 2. Environmental stakeholders in Hungary, information based on interest groups websites.
Actor (and founding) Staff Volunteers Finances Members
Energiaklub (1992) 24 10 118,011 € 30
Magyar	Természetvédők Szövetsége (1989) 19 Yes 150,000 € 100+
Levegő Munkacsoport (1988) 75 47 54,000 € 60+ HU NGOs
Greenpeace Hungary (2002) 19 100 900,000 € n.a.
Zöld Kapcsolat Egyesület (2005) 7 32 18,000 € 12
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share of nuclear energy usage by 10% (D. Burket, per-
sonal communication, August 7, 2018) and then 50% by
2040 (Nachmany et al., 2015). To this end, the 2015 Na-
tional Action Plan called for the construction of new NPP
units. The position of the pro-nuclear coalition was thus
very close to the legislation adopted while the ideal po-
sition of anti-nuclear movements was partly against any
newNPPs. ČEZ, for example, has strong leverage over en-
ergy policy and actively lobbies (Schwartzkopff, Schulz,
& Goritz, 2017). Since the company is state-owned, the
state assesses the impact of potential legislation on the
company (Osička & Černoch, 2017, p. 12). Thus, the
SEP emerged from cooperation between the govern-
ment and ČEZ (K. Polanecký, personal communication,
August 1, 2018), while ČEZ also strongly lobbies for the
EU emission trading system. To promote a non-carbon
transition in line with EU directives, it advocates more
nuclear energy (Schwartzkopff et al., 2017). ČNS also
pushed for the expansion of NPPs, and even was allowed
to co-draft some of the laws (D. Burket, personal commu-
nication, August 7, 2018).
Environmental groups, by contrast, mainly pushed to
stop nuclear energy usage and include renewables into
policies. The former extreme position was not attained,
while renewables were indeed taken into account. The
state argued that the complete abandonment of nuclear
energy is not yet possible because other sources could
not meet national energy demands. The state therefore
sought to compensate the elimination of coal-based en-
ergy with increased nuclear energy. Hence, environmen-
tal groups opposing nuclear energy were perceived as a
“complication” and excluded from policy-making. There-
fore, the state required additional technical expertise on
nuclear energy and only enabled pro-nuclear groups to
engage in decision-making (E. Sequens, personal commu-
nication, July 19, 2018).
However, opponents did succeed in generating me-
dia attention and bringing anti-nuclear positions into
the political debate. Beyond the SEP, they were success-
ful regarding nuclear waste storage legislation as Calla
claims. Together with municipalities that were chosen
as candidates for nuclear waste storage, Calla pushed
through a law to include municipalities when deciding
on the construction of storage places. The channels of
influence were meetings with parliamentarians who ac-
tively pursued the goal. Mayors were then authorised
to express their opinions on the underground storage of
nuclear waste. Renewables and coal mining reductions
also made their way into the SEP. Here channels of influ-
ence can be traced back rather to theMinistry of Industry
and Trade, especially the Standing Committee onNuclear
Energy, where interest groups are more frequently incor-
porated (E. Sequens, personal communication, July 19,
2018). Since renewable energy is only developing very
slowly, organisations aim to revive the debate and in-
clude renewables in the SEP as example models. How-
ever, environmental organisations generally faced enor-
mous difficulties in asserting their preferences, a main
reason being delays in the policy process. Also neither
ecological organisations nor nuclear energy opponents
were permitted to participate within the Czech National
Action Plan for the Development of the Nuclear Energy.
This hindered their access to governmental material dur-
ing the decision-making phase “behind closed doors”
(E. Sequens, personal communication, July 19, 2018).
The Hungarian NES 2030 targets “a sustainable and
secure energy sector while supporting the competitive-
ness of the economy” (International Energy Agency,
2017, p. 9). It aims for energy security and efficiency, a
greater share of renewables, the preservation of the cur-
rent nuclear capacity and decarbonising while exploiting
nuclear power. The country plans to increase the share
of 52% of the already generated electricity by adding at
least two more units to Paks and building a new power
plant Paks II (Gallai et al., 2015). The decisionwas framed
as a guarantee for self-sufficiency and independence
since Hungary highly depends on energy imports (Schulz,
Amon, Goritz & Schwartzkopff, 2017). The Ministry of
National Development	was the main actor in the policy
formulation process (International Energy Agency, 2017),
thus giving the government extensive clout. Neverthe-
less, NGOs like Energiaklub, the Clean Air Action Group
(Levegő Munkacsoport, 2015) and Greenpeace pushed
for a transition towards renewables—while some even
outright rejected nuclear energy (Levegő Munkacsoport,
2015). However, organisations with positions diverging
from the official state position face difficulties: if a group
supports the official position, it is easier to successfully
advocate one’s own position. By contrast, groups neutral
or not favouring the position of the stakeholder in power
face difficulties or even outright rejection when pursu-
ing their own interests. Hence, contrary to the generally
corporatist policy-making structures in Hungary, energy
decision-making structures are rather statist and impene-
trable because only interest groups close to the state are
strongly incorporated. Environmental groups are given
space to express themselves to maintain legitimacy, but
they generally have failed to attain their preferences and
policy ideals (P. Zagyvai, personal communication, Au-
gust 30, 2018).
Like in Czechia, it is difficult to distinguish between
the initial and final national position in Hungary, as the
government had a strong position that it rapidly pur-
sued without civil society consultations. Hence, neither
in the policy-definition nor policy-formulation process
were there open channels for nuclear opponents. Thus
in Kitschelt’s terminology political opportunity struc-
tures are relatively closed on the input side (1986).
Other sources even claim the state holds an energy pol-
icy monopoly (Méltányosság Politikaelemző Központ &
Energiaklub, 2011). For example, the parliament was not
seriously included in the Russian-Hungarian deal to con-
struct Paks II. Negotiations were short, while many par-
liamentarians learned about it from the press only (Nagy,
2014). The nuclear lobby, by contrast, was heavily in-
volved in the preparation process as the MVM worked
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on the issue for two years, prompting claims of “strate-
gic arrangements between the government and corpora-
tions” (Transparency International Hungary, 2014b). The
policy was thus crafted without regard to public opinion
(Perger, 2009).
Hungarian energy negotiations are held in “high poli-
tics” expert circles, while opponents of government pol-
icy are largely excluded or only have the opportunity to
express opinions on nearly finalised legislation (A. Perger,
personal communication, July 26, 2018; P. Zagyvai, per-
sonal communication, August 30, 2018). Thus, both en-
vironmental and anti-nuclear groups assess their degree
of preference attainment rather negatively to the extent
they were indeed able to raise awareness, initiate discus-
sions and draw attention to the problems of nuclear en-
ergy. However, they failed to substantially push decisions
in their preferred direction and could not influence the
Paks II agreement (A. Perger, personal communication,
July 26, 2018; P. Zagyvai, personal communication, Au-
gust 30, 2018).
5.4. Assessing the Hypotheses
How did our hypotheses match up against empirical
events? We assumed that interest groups rich in finan-
cial, staffing and personnel resources are likely to be
more powerful, especially when lobbying regulations are
lenient. Our interviews revealed that financial resources
indeed generated higher levels of activity in both coun-
tries and secured the further employment of staff, thus
ensuring organisational survival. Finances were insofar
relevant as they also enabled interest groups to employ
experts to analyse legislative proposals, facilitate access
to information and create information material (D. Bur-
ket, personal communication, August 7, 2018; P. Zagyvai,
personal communication, August 30, 2018). However,
the preference attainment analysis shows that these fac-
tors matter only up to a certain point, whereby we again
have to distinguish between industrial and environmen-
tal groups. In general, the latter have fewer funds avail-
able. Yet despite their failure to research their far-fetched
goals such as abolishing nuclear energy, organisations
like Hnutí DUHA influenced some less central aspects of
the Czech SEP. They were invited to comment on the
SEP especially in the fine-tuning phase and tried to raise
awareness for renewables. Specifically, they submitted
example models on how to implement a sustainable en-
ergy plan (K. Polanecký, personal communication, Au-
gust 1, 2018). By contrast, with even fewer personnel
and financial resources Calla was unsuccessful in reduc-
ing nuclear energy usage, but together with municipal-
ities succeeded in tackling the issue of nuclear waste.
Specifically, municipalities must agree on the construc-
tion of a new storage places and at this stage, Calla steps
in (E. Sequens, personal communication, July 19, 2018).
While some supporters of nuclear energy, e.g., ČNS,
have even smaller annual budgets, they participated in
drafting the policy. This was facilitated by their strong
media presence and personal contacts as individuals
within groups have often been acquainted for many
years. Hence, access proved easier if long-lasting per-
sonal ties exist (D. Burket, personal communication, Au-
gust 7, 2018; K. Polanecký, personal communication,
August 1, 2018). In Hungary, Greenpeace has even more
funds and personnel, but achieved little success be-
cause the Hungarian government proved impenetrable
for opposing groups (A. Perger, personal communication,
July 26, 2018). Industrial actors as well as the ČEZ and the
MVM not only have more resources, but are also partly
state-owned and have been incorporated in the policy-
making process for a	long time. Thus, although groups
lacking resourceswere at a disadvantage,wedetermined
no direct link between resources and preference attain-
ment. However, resources did enable higher levels of ac-
tivity such as funding environmental protection projects
or requests for independent analyses, while more per-
sonnel also enabled the recruitment experts to assess
issues or policy drafts (P. Zagyvai, personal communica-
tion, August 30, 2018). Gallai et al. (2015) suggest that
in Hungary financial resources were only partially rel-
evant, but acknowledged that larger organisations are
very successful. Therefore, the first hypothesis can be
partially confirmed.
We also found that specialised expertise facilitated
preference attainment but is only relevant when inter-
est groups have already established access to decision-
makers and are recognised in higher circles. All groups
in both countries claim to provide policy-makers with
specialised expertise. However, there is a difference in
the type of information: groups providing technical or
physical expertise such as research institutions enjoyed
greater recognition while interests groups focusing on
environmental issues like renewables were less influ-
ential. Expertise on renewables influenced public de-
bates and was more acknowledged by Czech authori-
ties (K. Polanecký, personal communication, August 1,
2018). ČNS even identified a shift in information de-
mand: while several years ago, technical informationwas
more significant, demands for economic and legal infor-
mation have increased (D. Burket, personal communica-
tion, August 7, 2018). Research on Hungary also stresses
the importance of expertise (Gallai et al., 2015) and
Greenpeace Hungary suggests they indeed aimed to ex-
change information with policy-makers and conducted
case studies. However, they could not shape policy—all
proposals were heard but later reformulated. Especially
in the case of Paks II, Energiaklub answered questions,
gave opinions and after consultations with the ministry,
the parliament entirely rewrote the proposal. The sug-
gestion to build a new NPP, that was originally not in-
cluded, was newly added (A. Perger, personal communi-
cation, July 26, 2018). By contrast, technical information
from research institutes was specifically demanded fre-
quently (P. Zagyvai, personal communication, August 30,
2018). These findings fall in line with previous research
which suggests that the nuclear energy discourse was
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conducted in a highly technical manner in closed com-
munities (Osička & Černoch, 2017), thus limiting pub-
lic participation (Ocelík et al., 2017). The same gener-
ally applies for Hungary (Vari & Ferencz, 2007). The anti-
nuclear lobby met a dead-end when providing informa-
tion and only succeeded in adding various new details
to legislation on nuclear waste storage or expanding re-
newables. Altogether, in both countries environmental
groups had weaker influence than industrial groups be-
cause they lacked the capacity to mobilise despite be-
ing smaller. Somewhat counterintuitively to the collec-
tive action dilemma (Olson, 1971), these smaller groups
seem tomiss the chance to influence the outcomeswhile
larger industrial groups have much greater leverage over
policy. Generally, the ideal positions of supporters and
the position of the lead ministry match while nuclear op-
ponents only exerted complimentary influence i.e., they
brought opposing positions into debates or achieved
small concessions e.g. the inclusion ofmunicipalities into
decision-making and upholding the debate on renew-
ables. The same pattern can be observed when compar-
ing the final national position with the ideal positions of
pro- and anti-nuclear groups. Industrial groupswere able
to attain their preferences while environmental groups
exerted negative influence by “hindering decisions or
their implementation, or preventing an issue from being
put on the policy agenda” (Gallai et al., 2015, p. 1484).
We also hypothesised that groups representing con-
centrated interests are more successful in preference
attainment because it is easier to mobilise their mem-
bers (Olson, 1971). Contrarily, our empirical findings
show that ČEZ collaborated with the government dur-
ing the preparation phase of the SEP (K. Polanecký, per-
sonal communication, August 1, 2018). Smaller and con-
centrated interests such as Calla only had minor suc-
cess, e.g. they could not completely stop the construc-
tion of new NPPs but did secure the inclusion of mu-
nicipalities into the decision-making process on nuclear
waste management (E. Sequens, personal communica-
tion, July 19, 2018).
Interview partners, alternatively, contended that
membership is a crucial prerequisite for preference at-
tainment. Membership can be twofold: first, interest
groupsmay have individual and corporatemembers; sec-
ond, interest groups themselves may be members of
larger groups i.e. umbrella groups. In Czechia, therewere
only few members in the least influential groups, while
e.g. ČNS had strong pro-nuclear membership consisting
of large corporations as well as many volunteers pro-
moting nuclear energy (D. Burket, personal communica-
tion, August 7, 2018). Even though all groups are mem-
bers of umbrella organisations, their level of activity i.e.
membership in more and larger umbrella groups either
on the European or international level is critical. In Hun-
gary the same applies: according to Gallai et al. (2015),
largemembership, networks and cooperation with other
organised interests and positions that correspond with
those of the government andmedia have a high explana-
tory value. Therefore the level of activity in pursuing
interests is an important factor: as already mentioned,
groups like the ČNS or Hnutí DUHA in Czechia partici-
pated either in the drafting phase of the SEP (D. Burket,
personal communication, August 7, 2018) or by includ-
ing renewables into the policy in the latter case (K. Pola-
necký, personal communication, August 1, 2018). By con-
trast, Calla, which has fewer members and is not rep-
resented in many umbrella organisations, only achieved
success on the local level (E. Sequens, personal communi-
cation, July 19, 2018). Similarly in Hungary, Greenpeace
cooperates only occasionallywith likeminded groups and
has little influence. This lack of cooperation is due to the
organisation’s philosophy—it operates with voluntary in-
dependent donations. They accept neither private funds
nor financing from the government, governmental or-
ganisations (e.g., Visegrád fund) or the EU in order to re-
main independent and neutral. Therefore, they collabo-
rate only on specific projects since some donors expect
certain results and the organisation often cannot coop-
erate with other groups (A. Perger, personal communica-
tion, July 26, 2018).
5.5. Interest Intermediation Structures in Comparison
What general conclusions can we draw regarding inter-
est intermediation structures? As noted above, Hungary
exhibits stronger market coordination (Tarlea, 2017) and
lobbying regulations, while Czechia is a more liberal mar-
ket economy with weaker lobbying regulations (Fink-
Hafner, 2011; McGrath, 2008). Contrary to a generally
more pluralist and unregulated interest group environ-
ment in Czechia, energy policy-making remains highly
statist and technocratic (E. Sequens, personal commu-
nication, July 19, 2018) with the direct incorporation of
nuclear energy enterprises such as ČEZ (D. Burket, per-
sonal communication, August 7, 2018). There are, how-
ever, signs of emerging corporatism as it was possible
for other groups to participate in debates on or in the
fine-tuning of already decided policies (K. Polanecký, per-
sonal communication, August 1, 2018). Thus altogether,
we observe a combination of (more pronounced) statist
and (weaker) corporatist features (D. Burket, personal
communication, August 7, 2018).
Hungarian energy policy-making appears to be more
open to civil society, as the public can attend hearings
and present opinions. However, these democratic par-
ticipative elements have their limits (P. Zagyvai, per-
sonal communication, August 30, 2018). After the draft
prepared in expert circles is ready, there is a very lim-
ited timespan for expressing opinions (on highly tech-
nical issues). Thus interests are generally defined by
state-owned companies and expert groups, thus creat-
ing unequal participation opportunities (A. Perger, per-
sonal communication, July 26, 2018). Interestingly, in
the preparation process, participants are invited, most
of whom are experts while external stakeholders are not
included. The information reaches them only after the
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decision has almost been taken. Afterwards, civil surveil-
lance is granted only to citizenswith technical knowledge.
Also, many groups wishing to participate do not have
the resources necessary to analyse an extensive draft
(P. Zagyvai, personal communication, August 30, 2018).
Thus corporatist structures exist, but policy-making re-
mains highly centralised and technocratic (Aalto et al.,
2017). We also hypothesised that resource-rich organisa-
tions in systems with lenient lobby regulations might ex-
ertmore influence. However, the existence of lobby regu-
lations matters little as structures and developments are
rather determined by the state and not interest groups—
at least in energy policy.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we put together a set of factors to analyse
the mobilisation capacity and impact of interest groups
on post-communist energy policies. Our general finding
is that strong state-industrial alliances persist in both
cases, which clearly enabled supporters of nuclear en-
ergy to attain their preferred positions. They closely co-
operated with state policy-makers in designing nuclear
policies, making it difficult to distinguish the exact posi-
tions of the state and the interest groups. Despite this
overarching finding, it also became apparent that civil
society groups (i.e., renewable energy and environmen-
tal groups) indeed demonstrate strong signs of mobili-
sation capacity and that various forums have emerged
enabling them to at least voice their demands. This has
resulted in numerous “cracks” in the state-industrial al-
liances, allowing environmental groups at least to make
modest modifications or corrections to pre-determined
policies. In other words, preference attainment is issue-
specific to the extent that even smaller, non-industrial
NGOs may achieve less bold objectives which do not al-
ter the pro-nuclear status quo (e.g., commitments to ex-
pand renewables, coal mining limits, regulations on mu-
nicipality inclusion regarding decisions on nuclear waste
storage). Thus, in Kitschelt’s terminology, the Czech and
Hungarian energy policy opportunity structures cannot
be considered entirely closed to civil societymobilisation
and input, but are more selectively open to those pursu-
ing state-favoured policies.
Beyond this general finding, we also determined that
financial and personnel resources are not necessarily au-
tomatically predictors of preference attainment. In both
countries, poorly equipped pro-nuclear actors were also
able to exercise influence to the extent that they were
backed by strong industrial lobbies. As for Olson’s (1971)
classic hypothesis on concentrated and diffuse interests,
we foundmembership in organisational associations and
umbrella organisations to be more significant than the
type of interest being pursued. Our hypothesis regarding
specialised expertise was also only partially confirmed in
these two cases. Interest groups must already have ac-
cess to decision-makers to be able to provide them with
expertise. Thus, the precondition for providing informa-
tion is essentially incorporation into state-industrial pol-
icy alliances.
Regarding interest intermediation constellations, the
energy sectors of both countries exhibit a mixture of cor-
poratist and statist features. Decision-making is not very
transparent and participation opportunities are unequal
since some groups have little access to policy-making.
This in turn has proven to be an impediment to pluralist
political competition and progressive policy change (i.e.,
towards renewable energy).
Where should this research agenda now be taken?
We admit that our study bears numerous methodologi-
cal constraints. Most notably, the technical nature of nu-
clear energy and strongly embedded status quo some-
what distort the generalisability of our findings, a prob-
lem further compounded by our limitation to two coun-
tries. Therefore, we argue that future research should
focus on other aspects of CEE energy policy (e.g., coal,
oil, energy efficiency) and other countries. We also be-
lieve that research on the region could benefit from new
approaches in interest group research, which focus on
novel variables such as the size of lobbying coalitions
(Klüver, 2011) or the professionalisation of CEE interest
groups through interactions with EU peers. Finally, given
the methodological shortcomings of our qualitative ap-
proach to interest groups, scholars should engage with
the quantitative, survey-based analysis of interest group
influence by incorporating a broader range of variables
to explain lobbying success.
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